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Supply shocks in China hit the world
economy via global supply chains
Qianxue Zhang 1
Abstract: Global supply chains have become increasingly important in inter-
national trade over the past decade. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to quantify
the role of supply-chain trade in transmitting and amplifying shocks, given the
challenge of identifying and tracing the exogenous shocks across economies. This
paper argues that the lockdown of Hubei province in China due to the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) outbreak provides a natural experiment to study the importance of
China’s role in global value chains. Since the lockdown started during the Lunar
New Year, Hubei’s migrant workers who went home could not return to workplaces
in other provinces, resulting in a massive labor supply shock. I feed the supply
shock through a Ricardian model with intermediate goods and sectoral linkages to
study trade and welfare effects across several economies. While welfare in China
is the most strongly affected, the shock also has sizeable implications for the US
and the UK. However, close neighbors such as South Korea and Japan gain from
the shock. There are large variations regarding the sectoral contributions to the
aggregate welfare changes. The model also performs well in predicting bilateral
export changes.
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Global supply chains have changed the pattern of trade by allowing interna-
tional production fragmentation. While countries benefit from access to cheaper
intermediate goods and a wider variety, they also face more risks. Both theoret-
ical and empirical studies have shown the importance of global supply chains in
propagating shocks across borders and amplifying aggregate fluctuations. 2 Nev-
ertheless, studies on how a shock in one country impact the international trade
and welfare in other countries via global supply chains remain scant, largely due
to the difficulty of identifying exogenous shocks. This paper argues that Hubei’s
lockdown provides a natural experiment to study the influence of a labor supply
shock in China on international trade and welfare through global supply chains.
The lockdown of Hubei province started in January and ended in late March.
When the lockdown began in late January, it was the Chinese New Year. Millions
of migrant workers returned home to celebrate the festival. Due to the lockdown,
Hubei’s migrants were unable to travel outside the province and thus could not
go back to work. This resulted in a massive and unanticipated labor supply
shock in Hubei and other provinces. The supply shock was then propagated and
amplified via regional and global supply chains, in which Hubei is deeply involved
due to its central location in China. According to Zheng et al. (2020), 34% of the
communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment produced
by Hubei were used as intermediate inputs by other Chinese provinces in 2015.
Moreover, as one of Hubei’s pillar industries, the electrical machinery equipment
accounted for 27% of China’s total exports in 2019. Given the importance of Hubei
in supply-chain trade, the lockdown provides a unique window to understand the
impact of labor supply disruptions on global value chains.
A key feature of Hubei’s lockdown that enables me to focus on the labor supply
shock in China is the timing. When Hubei entered the lockdown in January, other
economies worldwide were still relatively untouched. Only in late March did some
other countries start quarantines. This fact limited the impact from other foreign
countries’ lockdown on international trade.3 Certainly, some other events could
2Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) provide a great summary of the recent development on
this topic.
3Although some countries in Europe took lockdown measure in late March, the drop in
exports of the European Union only started to show up in April. See: Eurostat News Re-
lease, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/december/tradoc 151969.pdf. Latest access:
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have happened within China over this period and it is more realistic to incorporate
all of them. However, other types of shocks complicate the problem and may
encounter endogeneity issues. Besides, although China has experienced structural
upgrade, the main export-oriented sectors are still relatively labor-intensive (Lin,
Wang, et al., 2018). Given the fact that labor mobility is highly restricted over
the period, a labor supply shock, even cannot fully capture the effect, should at
least be one of the largest contributors of the first-order effect.4 Furthermore, this
paper does not claim the labor supply shock is the only source of the changes
in international trade and welfare, but rather shows that it matters even other
factors are not considered.
I build a Ricardian model with sectoral linkages and trade in intermediate
goods to analyze the effects of the labor supply shock. This model was intro-
duced by Caliendo and Parro (2015) to study the trade and welfare effects of
NAFTA. I adopt this model to estimate how the sectoral labor supply shocks
caused by the COVID-19 in China change welfare and trade patterns worldwide.
This model enables me to study the total welfare changes and further decompose
the welfare changes into terms of trade effect and what I introduce as “produc-
tivity effect”. Caliendo and Parro (2015) use terms of trade effect, which is a
multi-lateral weighted change in exporter prices relative to the change in importer
prices, to measure the welfare changes from NAFTA’s tariff reductions. Here I
borrow the name to study the welfare changes caused by Hubei’s lockdown. The
productivity effect demonstrates the pure impact of a labor productivity shock on
aggregate welfare in an economy.5 The decomposition displays each source’s im-
portance in transmitting and amplifying the original labor supply shock through
global supply chains.
To feed the sectoral supply shocks through the model, I need to identify their
magnitude. I adopt an approach from Luo and Tsang (2020) to measure the
shocks. They estimate the sectoral labor productivity shocks in each province
by calculating the proportions of Hubei’s migrants working in that province. As
mentioned before, the lockdown limited migrant workers from traveling back to
17.Nov.2020
4First-order effect here means the immediate impact on the supply-side. Rio-Chanona et al.
estimate the first-order effects in the United States and find that impacts from the supply-side
are much larger than from the demand-side.
5“A change in labor productivity is most easily interpreted as a technology or supply shock,”
as Shimer (2005) stated.
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the provinces they worked in before the lockdown. Therefore, the share of Hubei’s
workers in each industry offered a good approximation for the sectoral shock mag-
nitude in other provinces. How about the losses in Hubei? I consider two different
ranges of losses: minor losses (case one) and full losses (case two). While the
former assumes the loss in output is proportional to the labor share in production,
the latter assumes a full stoppage of Hubei’s production. The real situation should
lie somewhere in between.
By treating December 2019 as the starting point, I calibrate the model us-
ing data from the World Input and Output Database (WIOD) and the OECD
Structural Analysis (STAN) Database. I obtain the monthly trade flows from the
International Trade Centre (ITC) as the latest data was not available in other
commonly used databases. However, one drawback of this database is that the
data could not be collected at an aggregate level, i.e., only one bilateral trade
flow can be downloaded each time. To provide a timely estimation subject to
the data limitation, I consider six other economies: Japan, the Republic of Korea
(Korea hereafter), the European Union (27 countries, EU hereafter), the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the rest of the world (ROW hereafter). Al-
though the number of selected economies (except for ROW) is relatively small,
they are highly representative and account for approximately 50% of China’s total
exports in 2019. Moreover, the overall effects should not be significantly influenced
by the number of economies. Since commodities are defined by the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 2017 at the 6-digit level, I use
the United Nations concordance table to concord them into 2-digit International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Revision 4
divisions. I get 19 sectors after clustering, which contain agricultural, mining, all
manufacturing sectors in ISIC Rev 4 and an aggregated service sector.
Using real income to measure welfare, the estimated welfare reductions in
China are 2.15% and 4.20% under the assumptions of minor and full losses in
Hubei. Whereas the UK and the US are hit the most severely, Japan and Korea’s
real income increase. After decomposing the welfare effects into terms of trade
effects and productivity effects, I find the former explains the major parts. The
productivity effects only have very limited impacts on other economies’ welfare.
In case one, productivity effects in economies except China are all negative but
above -0.1%. Interestingly, the terms of trade effects are positive in five out of
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seven economies, including China. The improved terms of trade in China are due
to the higher export prices, which compensate for the decreases in volume. While
for the other economies, the intuition behind the higher terms of trade is that the
higher prices in China lead firms to substitute relatively cheaper goods in those
countries for China’s exports. Regarding the magnitude, the overall effect depends
on the relative increases in multi-lateral and multi-sector weighted export and im-
port prices. Korea’s terms of trade increase by 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively, in
both cases, which are the highest among all.
To further understand the sources of the aggregate welfare changes, I study
the sectoral contributions. There is a large amount of heterogeneity across sec-
tors. Nevertheless, a handful of sectors can explain the major parts of the welfare
changes. For China, the 19th sector explains 50% of the productivity effect, given
this sector is a sum of all non-manufacture sectors except for agriculture and min-
ing. The main contributors in other economies are Computer, Auto and Other
transport as expected because those sectors are the hardest hit and are export-
oriented in China. Thus increases in their prices and decreases in their output have
significant impacts on total welfare. For instance, the Computer and the Other
Transport sectors contribute 27.45% and 59.12% to Korea’s productivity effect
and -15.79% and -21.12% to the US’s terms of trade effect in case one. Except
for those sectors, the Mining sector plays an important role in enhancing terms of
trade in the US and the rest of the world.
World output decreases by 0.14% in case one and 0.24% in case two. The
impacts are still impressive given the short period under study and the ignorance
of second-order effects such as the contagion through supply chains. The Computer
sector and the Minerals sector are the most affected. The former’s output falls by
0.66% and the latter by 0.49%.
Finally, I conduct several counterfactual exercises to reexamine the importance
of the sectoral linkages and trade in intermediate goods, and the robustness of the
baseline results. In the first exercise, I drop the intermediate goods and assume
all exports are the final goods. Secondly, I test what will happen if there is no
sectoral interdependence. I find the welfare effects become negligible without the
intermediate goods and drop to around half to one-third of the benchmark levels
without the sectoral linkages. In my last exercise, I relax the restriction of sector
19 from assuming services are non-tradable. I find including trade in services has
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a very small effect on the baseline results.
This paper is closely related to articles that examine the importance of pro-
duction networks in national and international trade. Caliendo and Parro (2015)
provide evidence of the significant role of sectoral linkages in international trade
and welfare analysis. My paper confirms their finding that when the intermediate
goods or input-output linkages are ignored, the estimated welfare reductions are
much lower. The main difference between my work and theirs is that I use an
exogenous labor supply shock while they use a trade shock from tariff reductions.
My work also complements theirs by showing that the model is able to isolate the
influence of productivity changes on welfare. In a later work, Caliendo et al. (2018)
study how the disaggregated productivity changes across US states are transmit-
ted through the intersectoral and interregional trade linkages. They also treat
productivity changes as exogenous to the model and investigate the influences of
regional and sectoral productivity changes on welfare. I use a similar technique
but focus on international trade and global welfare changes.
Another related set of papers study the role of supply chains in amplifying
disruptions caused by natural disasters. For example, Carvalho et al. (2016) study
the influence of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 through the supply
chains using a general equilibrium model with input-output linkages. They find
the shock is propagated through both the downstream and upstream chains and
has significant indirect effects. Similarly, Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and Boehm,
Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2019) examine the transmission of shocks via firm-
level linkages in the United States using country-level data and cross-country data
separately. My work complements these studies with a quantitative exercise to
show that the labor supply shock in China, caused by an unexpected disaster, has
a large impact on the global economy from a macro perspective.
Finally, this paper is also closely related to the rapidly increasing research
about the pandemic’s impact through global supply chains under various setups.
Some of this research focuses on the influence of COVID-19 on a particular country,
e.g. Inoue and Todo (2020); Fadinger, Schymik, et al. (2020); Baqaee and Farhi
(2020); and Pichler et al. (2020). Others focuses on the different measures such as
social distancing and quarantine taken in many countries around the world, e.g.
Barrot, Grassi, and Sauvagnat (2020), Mandel and Veetil (2020), Bonadio et al.
(2020). The most relevant paper is a parallel but independent work by Eppinger et
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al. (2020). They use the Ricardian model extended by Antras and Chor (2018) to
estimate the welfare effects of Hubei’s lockdown. The main difference is that they
back out the sectoral labor supply shocks by estimating the initial output drops in
January and February in China. Using the data of 2017-2019, they first estimate
the expected output in 2020 and then use the differences between the expected
and the observed values to back out the shocks. Moreover, they take intermediate
and final goods’ prices to be fixed when estimating the shocks. My work differs
from theirs in three dimensions: (i) I use the number of migrant workers from
Hubei to other provinces to identify the labor supply shock. (ii) My event window
is from January to March, while they only consider January and February. (iii)
I further decompose the welfare effects and study the different contributors. My
results are partly consistent with theirs that the welfare losses are reduced by 40%
when restricting the supply chain trade. However, the magnitude of my estimation
is much lower due to the different timing and identification approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
Ricardian model with sectoral linkages and trade in intermediate goods. Section
3 describes the source of data and calibration techniques. The baseline results
are displayed and discussed in section 4. Section 5 makes further extensions and
compares the results with the baseline. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model is based on the Ricardian model with sectoral linkages, trade in in-
termediate goods and sectoral heterogeneity in production, developed by Caliendo
and Parro (2015). This model is a supply-side model. Since the COVID-19 is com-
monly recognized as a first-order supply shock, the model serves the goal of this
paper well. I modify the model by assuming the tariffs are zero, and the produc-
tivity shocks are the only exogenous shocks. I derive the theoretical decomposition
of the welfare effect into terms of trade effect and productivity effect.
2.1 Households
There are N countries and J sectors. Labor is mobile across sectors, but immo-
bile across countries. In each country n ∈ N, there are Ln households. Households
7








αjn = 1. (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
In = wnLn +Dn. (2.2)
where In is income, wn is the wage, Ln is the labor supply and Dn is the trade
deficit.
2.2 Firms of intermediate goods
In each country n, firms in sector j produce a continuum of intermediate goods
ωj ∈ [0, 1] with labor ln and composite intermediate goods mk,jn (ωj). Firms have
different efficiency level zjn(ω
j) for the production and the production function is






















The price of the intermediate good ωj is determined by the unit cost of the
firms. Denote the price of the composite goods from sector k by P kn , the cost of


















−γjn is a constant.
In order to solve for P kn , I need to consider the production of the composite
intermediate goods.
2.3 Firms of composite intermediate goods
The composite intermediate goods Qjn functions as both the final consumption
goods and the input of the intermediate goods mentioned in Section 2.2. 6
6Denote the composite goods produced by firms in country n, sector j as Qjn. Then the










To produce Qjn, firms search for the suppliers with the lowest cost across all









where σj > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods in sector
j and rjn(ω
j) is the demand for ωj.
To maximize profits, the demand for rjn(ω









where pjn is the lowest unit price of ω












Trade in goods from country n to country i in sector j incurs the standard
“iceberg” costs Samuelson (1954), which means transferring one unit of good to
country n requires producing djni ≥ 1 units of such good in country i. d
j
ii is





Therefore, the price of one unit intermediate good ωj in country n that is








Since the firms are searching for the lowest cost supplier, the actual price paid is
the minimum across all countries,
pjn = min{p
j
ni; i = 1, ..., N}. (2.8)
To get a simple expression for the distribution of prices, I follow Eaton and
Kortum (2002) to assume the country n′s efficiency distribution is Frechet and is
independent across countries, sectors and goods. The exact formula of price of the
composite goods P jn is
P jn = κ
j[Φjn]
−1/θj , (2.9)
7An important feature for this model is that the production of the composite intermediate
goods Qjn requires the intermediate goods ω
j as inputs. Thus the productions of intermediate











and Γ is the Gamma function. I also assume that σj < 1 + θj to ensure a well
defined price index. Some sectors are non-tradable by assuming the local suppliers




n is also the price for final goods that consumers buy. The









To link the model with data, the fraction of country n′s expenditure on goods
of sector j from country i is necessary. Define Xjni as country n
′s expenditure of
sector j goods from country i and Xjn as country n
′s total spending on sector j




























2.6 Total Expenditure and trade balance
Total expenditure of country n on sector j goods is calculated by adding the












where In = wnLn +Dn. The sectoral j
′s deficit is given by the difference between





in. The national deficit is the sum of all sectoral deficits, Dn =∑J
j=1D
j
n. Dn is exogenously given in the model, but the sectoral deficits are
endogenous. The sum of all economies’ deficits is zero,
∑N
n=1Dn = 0.














in = Dn (2.12)















and equations (2.9) and (2.10).
9The non-tradable sectors will not influence the result as they cancel out.
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2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is written in relative changes.10 This approach is introduced
and used by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008). Using the changes from
the original equilibrium reduces the data requirements as the parameters that
do not change are canceled out. This significantly simplifies the calibration and
makes the comparison straightforward. Besides, this approach does not require the
assumption of bilateral symmetries, which is rejected by many empirical studies. I
measure the sectoral labor supply shocks due to Hubei’s lockdown by the changes
in labor productivity as Luo and Tsang (2020). To be more specific, the changes
in T jn, which measure the overall efficiency in producing any good ω
j in country n.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) treat T jn as country n’s state of technology and governs
the absolute advantages across the continuum of goods. A lower T jn, in my case,
means firms are less likely to have high efficiency draws for any good ωj. This is
a reasonable description for the COVID shock as most goods, if not all, should be
produced less efficiently.



























































in = Dn (2.17)






ni, an equilibrium is a
wage vector w ∈ RN++ and prices {P jn}
J,N
j=1,n=1 that satisfy equilibrium conditions (2.4), (2.11),
(2.12), (2.13) and (2.14).
11Note the deficits remain the same after the shock because I want to make sure the only
source of all changes in the model is T̂ jn.
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2.8 Welfare
The welfare effects are one key of the exercise. I first derive the representation
of the total welfare changes and then decompose the welfare changes into terms
of trade and productivity effects. The name “terms of trade effect” is borrowed
from Caliendo and Parro (2015), which measures the multilateral weighted sectoral
change in export and import prices. I introduce the name “ productivity effect” to
measure how the import-weighted sectoral productivity changes influence welfare.










Since we are interested in the changes, we get the following by totally differ-




d lnwn − d lnPn. (2.18)



























d lnT ji , (2.19)
where Ejni is the sector j’s exports from country n to country i and M
j
ni is the
imports of country n from country i. The first term is known as multi-lateral and
multi-sectoral terms of trade effect and the second term is the productivity effect,
which measures the change welfare due to the productivity change. Notice that
it is not sufficient to say an increase in the input costs in country n relative to
country i contributes positively to country n’s welfare, because it also depends on
the relative values of exports and imports of country n. However, it is clear from
the second part of (2.19) that an increase in productivity in other countries (T jn)
will enhance country n’s welfare if the trade elasticity θj > 0. 13 This is intuitive
since higher productivity in country n indicates a lower price there. As countries
are always searching for suppliers with the lowest costs, it benefits all countries.
3 Calibration and Simulation
To analyze the trade and welfare effects, I calibrate the model parameters
using the data from the World Input Output Database and the OECD STAN
12The derivations are in Appendix B.
13Here I adopt the same concept of trade elasticity from Caliendo and Parro (2015), which is
the dispersion of productivity θj .
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Database. As the latest version of the World Input-Output Table (WIOT) is the
2014 Table, I assume the parameters did not change from 2014 to 2020. The
underlying assumption is that the massive supply shocks are likely to swamp the
small changes in the parameters. I also need the bilateral trade flows data in
December 2019, which are collected from the International Trade Centre.
3.1 Data and Calibration









n are calibrated using data from WIOT. γ
j
n is the share of value added.








γj,kn is the share of sector k’s spending on sector j’s intermediate goods in country
n, times (1− γjn). It measures the importance of sector j’s intermediate goods in
sector k’s production. WIOT has detailed sectoral consumption of intermediate
goods.
αjn is the final consumption share of sector j’s goods in country n. I use the total
expenditure minus the intermediate expenditure in sector j, divide by the total
final absorption in country n to estimate it. To calculate the total expenditure,
I sum the sectoral imports of each country. The final absorption is calculated by
value added plus the trade deficit in each sector. I collect the trade flows data for
2014 from the OECD STAN database. Note the parameters for the EU and the
ROW are calculated using the average of all countries involved.
For the remaining parameters θj, I use Caliendo and Parro (2015)’s estimations
with 99% sample and I correct the Chemicals sector’s elasticity as China is an
outlier in this sector. The parameters are displayed in Table 1.
Finally, the sectoral bilateral trade flows are collected from the International
Trade Centre’s Trade Map Database. 14 Trade Map provides detailed monthly
import and export data at Harmonized System 6 digits (HS6) level. I obtain the
sectoral data for the seven economies in December 2019. I use the concordance
table provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) to convert trade
flows into International Standard Industrial Classification Rev 4 divisions. After
merging some sectors, I get 19 sectors in total, where the 19th sector is the ag-
14https://www.trademap.org, last accessed: 16.Oct.2020.
13
gregation of all non-manufacture sectors other than Agricultural and Mining (see
Appendix A1). Note the exports from the ROW to the world are the sum of other
six economies’ imports from the ROW. The gross productions are not available
for December, 2019, thus I back out the values by assuming the share of domestic
consumption as a proportion of gross production in each economy remained the










9 Rubber and plastic 1.67
10 Minerals 2.41
11 Basic metals 3.28
12 Metal products 6.99
13 Computer 8.53
14 Electrical equipment 12.91
15 Machinery 1.45
16 Auto 1.84
17 Other transport 0.39
18 Other manufacturing 3.98
19 Other activities 8.22
Table 1: Sectoral trade elasticity
Note: The values are obtained from Caliendo and Parro (2015) Table 1, 99% sample. Pa-
rameter for the Chemicals sector is adjusted according to their footnote 42. The value for Sector
13 is the average of Office, Communication and Medical sectors in the original paper.
3.2 Productivity shocks
I also need the sectoral productivity shocks (T̂ ji ) for China, which by assump-
tion, are exogenous to the model. I adopt the approach in Luo and Tsang (2020)
to estimate the productivity shocks by measuring the sectoral labor losses due to
14
the lockdown of Hubei province. The magnitude of shocks in each province is
approximated using the proportion of Hubei’s migrants working in that province.
Since 80% of the migrants went home during the Lunar New Year, the lockdown
prevented them from travelling back to work. I further consider two cases for
Hubei’s lockdown, assuming minor losses and full losses of Hubei’s production re-
spectively. However, not all of the sectoral productivity shocks are available in Luo
and Tsang (2020). As six sectors are missing, I need to make further assumptions
about the productivity shocks in those sectors.15 I assume the productivity shocks
are -5% in case one and -15% in case two for those sectors. 5% is the average of
Luo and Tsang’s estimation, while 15% is the magnitude of China’s manufacturing
production reduction during January and February.16
The productivity shocks under these two cases are displayed in Table 2.
15These six sectors are Petroleum, Chemicals, Rubber and plastic products, Computer, Elec-
trical equipment, Motor vehicles, and Other transport equipment. According to the industrial
value added data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, those sectors have similar
losses.




Number Sectors Case one Case two
1 Agriculture -4.5% -8.7%
2 Mining -1.9% -3.7%
3 Food -2.2% -7.4%
4 Textiles -1.3% -5.5%
5 Wood -1.2% -3.9%
6 Paper -1.2% -3.9%
7 Petroleum -5.0% -15.0%
8 Chemicals -1.4% -5.0%
9 Rubber and plastic -5.0% -15.0%
10 Minerals -2.1% -6.8%
11 Basic metals -1.1% -3.7%
12 Metal products -1.1% -3.7%
13 Computer -5.0% -15.0%
14 Electrical equipment -5.0% -15.0%
15 Machinery -1.3% -4.9%
16 Auto -5.0% -15.0%
17 Other transport -5.0% -15.0%
18 Other manufacturing -4.4% -8.3%
19 Other activities -6.8% -6.8%
Table 2: Productivity shocks
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Welfare effects
The welfare changes for each economy due to the productivity shocks in China
are displayed in Table 3. In the first case, when the sectoral shocks are mild and
relatively uniform, the welfare decreases are smaller than in the second case for all
economies except Japan and Korea. After decomposing the welfare changes into
two parts, terms of trade (TOT) effect and productivity effect, I find the major
sources of the welfare effects are the TOT effects in most economies.
16
Welfare effect Terms of trade effect Productivity effect
Case one Case two Case one Case two Case one Case two
China -2.15% -4.20% 0.03% 0.01% -2.18% -4.21%
Japan 0.13% 0.23% 0.14% 0.29% -0.02% -0.05%
Korea 0.13% 0.21% 0.19% 0.39% -0.06% -0.18%
EU27 0.02% -0.04% 0.05% 0.04% -0.03% -0.08%
UK -0.11% -0.20% -0.08% -0.13% -0.02% -0.07%
US -0.11% -0.19% -0.09% -0.14% -0.02% -0.05%
ROW -0.04% -0.11% 0.01% 0.03% -0.05% -0.14%
Table 3: Welfare effects from the productivity shocks
For China, the productivity effects are high in both cases and are the main
contributors to the welfare declines. All other economies are affected moderately
if only productivity effects are taken into account. Korea and the ROW are the
most affected, where the drops in welfare are 0.06% and 0.05% in the first case,
and 0.18% and 0.14% in the second case. Japan, the UK, and the US are weakly
affected. However, the magnitude is not very different across all economies. Since
China’s sectoral productivity shocks are the only source of the productivity effects,
the direct influences on other economies are limited.
To better understand which sectors are the main driving forces of the produc-
tivity effects, I further consider the sectoral contributions. Figure 1 and Table 4
present the results in case one. From the subplot of China in Figure 1, the pro-
ductivity effect mainly comes from the non-tradable sector (Other activities).17
Because this sector sums all non-manufacture sectors except for Agriculture and
Mining, it is reasonable to see a high contribution to the aggregate effect. The
Other transport sector and the Auto sector both account for more than 10%. For
the other economies, the Computer sector and the Other Transport sector play
the most critical roles. The results are consistent with the fact that these sec-
tors comprise a large part of China’s total exports. According to Figure 1, the
Other transport sector is the largest contributor to the productivity effect for all
economies, following by the Computer sector. According to Table 4, the Computer
and Other Transport sectors contribute 27.45% and 59.12% to Korea’s welfare re-
duction in case one and 28.55% and 61.50% in case two. For the ROW, the Other
17I also take the non-tradable sector into account, which is different from Caliendo and Parro
(2015) since they are interested in the changes in tariffs, where the non-tradable sectors do not
play any role.
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transport sector also explains more than 50% of the productivity effect in both
cases. This is not only because China is exporting a lot of other transport equip-
ment, but also because the sectoral trade elasticity is low. The Chemicals sector
contributes negatively to all countries, since its elasticity of trade θj is negative
(see Table 1).
Sectors
China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW
TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod
Agriculture -1.61% 4.60% 0.12% 0.39% -0.18% 0.40% 7.69% 0.36% -1.61% 0.16% 2.69% 0.20% -4.22% 1.40%
Mining -24.64% 1.02% -29.00% 1.96% -30.53% 0.60% -14.20% 0.05% 7.31% 0.01% 11.96% 0.00% 26.40% 0.13%
Food -3.70% 5.18% -1.87% 3.91% -1.35% 2.37% 1.22% 1.11% -4.27% 0.85% -2.22% 1.17% 3.58% 1.44%
Textiles 10.82% 0.55% -1.18% 3.47% -2.11% 3.22% 3.54% 2.54% -6.76% 2.05% -6.26% 2.73% -3.21% 2.39%
Wood 0.00% 0.19% -0.32% 0.12% -0.43% 0.09% 1.24% 0.17% -1.52% 0.16% -0.74% 0.15% 0.03% 0.06%
Paper 0.20% 0.11% 0.78% 0.07% 0.61% 0.05% 3.81% 0.05% 0.09% 0.06% -0.83% 0.14% -1.95% 0.07%
Petroleum 2.55% 0.29% 4.55% 0.05% 10.19% 0.41% 26.76% 0.11% 7.66% 0.12% 3.54% 0.05% -20.12% 0.41%
Chemicals -6.20% -14.67% 3.00% -20.33% 4.48% -29.36% -2.43% -12.76% -12.42% -11.07% -7.11% -8.00% 7.74% -9.50%
Rubber and plastic 2.84% 6.30% 1.28% 17.98% 1.55% 7.22% -2.37% 12.66% -4.01% 18.89% -1.43% 12.99% 0.19% 9.71%
Minerals 2.34% 3.38% 0.57% 2.37% -0.42% 4.59% 0.69% 2.25% -1.05% 2.41% -0.73% 2.02% -1.25% 2.83%
Basic metals -8.23% 2.43% 3.04% 1.74% 6.23% 3.02% -0.79% 0.83% 9.98% 0.23% -0.99% 0.19% 2.57% 1.49%
Metal products 5.56% 0.36% 0.26% 2.05% 1.70% 0.89% 1.59% 0.85% -2.08% 0.81% -3.68% 1.29% -2.07% 0.72%
Computer 12.30% 2.87% 9.75% 27.51% 14.57% 27.45% -3.76% 20.65% -12.57% 12.55% -15.79% 18.55% -0.51% 15.07%
Electrical equipment 6.74% 1.18% 9.19% 4.46% 5.46% 2.53% 5.27% 4.48% -6.29% 3.72% -4.01% 3.33% -7.13% 3.28%
Machinery 4.75% 3.94% 10.31% 6.63% 4.82% 6.32% 4.67% 10.96% -5.84% 8.55% -3.72% 8.94% -6.20% 7.60%
Auto -0.84% 13.29% 22.20% 9.99% 14.33% 5.71% -12.27% 8.86% -11.50% 7.82% -21.12% 9.61% 9.67% 4.43%
Other transport 3.68% 18.92% 2.13% 30.08% 0.81% 59.12% 4.09% 34.47% 3.26% 41.27% -8.88% 32.50% -0.75% 53.09%
Other manufacturing 3.01% 0.47% 0.45% 7.56% -0.23% 5.37% -3.61% 12.37% -1.77% 11.41% -4.31% 14.11% 2.41% 5.37%
Other activities 0.00% 49.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 4: Sectoral contributions to the aggregate effects (case one)
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Figure 1: Sectoral contributions to the aggregate effects (case one). Note: The figure presents sectoral contributions to total welfare changes in each economy due to the productivity in
China. The red points show the productivity effects and the green points show the terms of trade effects. The unit of the x-axis is percentage (%).
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China Japan Korea EU UK US ROW
Agriculture 0.03% 1.69% 1.04% 1.57% 1.92% 1.94% 1.48%
Mining 0.82% 1.96% 1.52% 1.67% 1.28% 1.37% 1.25%
Food 0.81% 1.92% 1.98% 2.05% 2.05% 2.42% 2.23%
Textiles 1.08% 2.04% 1.91% 1.74% 1.47% 2.45% 1.96%
Wood 0.83% 1.93% 1.67% 1.92% 1.90% 2.43% 1.84%
Paper 1.22% 2.06% 2.01% 1.96% 1.91% 2.31% 2.18%
Petroleum 1.24% 1.43% 1.96% 1.98% 2.04% 1.79% 1.62%
Chemicals 1.51% 2.49% 2.02% 2.56% 1.98% 1.90% 2.34%
Rubber and plastic 1.45% 2.37% 1.78% 2.14% 1.73% 2.14% 2.27%
Minerals 1.36% 2.07% 2.11% 2.02% 2.42% 2.16% 1.93%
Basic metals 1.51% 2.22% 2.06% 2.27% 2.58% 2.63% 1.96%
Metal products 1.57% 2.18% 1.72% 1.78% 1.53% 2.12% 2.06%
Computer 1.90% 2.11% 1.84% 1.79% 1.59% 1.32% 2.11%
Electrical equipment 1.71% 2.40% 1.86% 1.97% 1.89% 1.94% 2.14%
Machinery 1.68% 2.05% 1.88% 1.93% 1.94% 2.22% 2.19%
Auto 2.88% 3.40% 2.66% 2.89% 2.80% 3.11% 3.10%
Other transport 2.08% 2.54% 2.11% 2.06% 2.54% 2.52% 2.51%
Other manufacturing 0.73% 2.36% 1.97% 1.78% 1.49% 2.13% 2.29%
Other activities 1.09% 1.82% 1.57% 1.60% 1.89% 1.91% 1.74%
Table 5: Changes in sectoral costs (case one)
The terms of trade effects display some interesting features. Although China is
hit seriously by the productivity shocks, the terms of trade improve in both cases,
so do Japan, Korea, and the ROW. However, the UK and the US suffer from
welfare reductions as their terms of trade deteriorate. The EU has a higher TOT
in case one and a lower TOT in case two. To understand the reason, we need to
look at the changes in input costs in Table 5, as the export price is increasing in ĉ.
18 From equation (2.19), the terms of trade effect is determined by the differences
between the multilateral-weighted changes in export and import prices. According
to Table 5, every sector has a higher price after the shock, but the magnitude of the
increase is different. Thus the overall effect will depend on the relative increases
in export-weighted and import-weighted prices.
The Computer sector contributes a significant proportion to China’s improved
TOT, following by Textiles and Electrical equipment. The Computer sector’s
18I only present the cost changes in case one here, as case two shows a similar pattern. Results
for case two are shown in Appendix A4.
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price increases by 1.9% in China, which is a relatively high increase compared
with other economies’. Because this is a leading export sector in China, it has a
positive contribution (see Table 4). On the contrary, China is a net importer in
the automotive industry. Since the EU and Japan, the two largest auto exporters
to China, both have significant rises in their prices, the Auto sector contributes
-0.84% to China’s TOT. Korea and Japan’s costs of production after the shocks
as well as the sectoral contributions are relatively similar. However, the largest
contributors to the increased TOT of Japan and Korea are the Auto sector and
the Computer sector, respectively.
The United Kingdom and the United States experience the highest TOT losses.
Sectors related to natural resources like basic metals and petroleum improve UK’s
TOT due to increased export prices, but 13 out of 19 sectors contribute negatively,
leading to a final reduction in welfare. The Computer sector and the Auto sector
contribute -15.79% and -21.12% to the US’s TOT. The US is a net importer in
those two sectors. China and the ROW account for 80% of the US’s imports of
computers, and their prices increase significantly. Thus the higher import price
swamps the increased export price in the US.
Figure 2: Trade flows in the Mining sector before and after the shock
The ROW also has a lower welfare, resulting from the productivity effect. But
its TOT improve by 0.01% and 0.03% in both cases. The largest contributor to
the positive TOT effect is the Mining sector. From Table 4, the Mining sector
contributes 26.4% to the ROW’s TOT. Figure 2 shows the Mining sector’s trade
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flows. It is evident that the ROW’s Mining sector is so important that it could
easily dominate the welfare change.
4.2 Output changes
Regarding the output changes, world output drops by 0.14% in case one and
0.24% in case two. The impacts are still impressive given the short period under
study and the ignorance of second-order effects such as the contagion through
the supply chains. I display the changes in the world sectoral output in Table 6
for case one. According to Table 6, every sector has a lower output in the new
equilibrium. The Computer sector and the Minerals sector are the most affected.
The former’s output falls by 0.66%, and the latter by 0.49%.
China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW Sectoral Total
Agriculture -0.58% 0.33% 0.21% -0.50% -1.25% -0.85% 0.20% -0.25%
Mining 0.16% -6.38% -5.22% -5.52% -1.70% -0.02% 0.79% -0.10%
Food -1.03% 0.59% 0.09% -0.12% -0.08% 0.26% 0.10% -0.19%
Textiles 0.44% -0.82% -0.65% 0.70% 2.15% -3.03% -0.86% -0.06%
Wood 0.09% -0.03% 0.10% -0.74% -0.40% -2.07% 0.19% -0.24%
Paper 0.16% 0.14% 0.02% 0.51% 0.50% -0.79% -2.22% -0.25%
Petroleum 2.60% 9.33% -9.28% -6.17% -4.84% 0.62% 14.18% -0.33%
Chemicals -1.94% 0.83% 0.60% 0.32% -0.07% 0.33% 0.29% -0.36%
Rubber and plastic -1.80% 0.22% 1.14% 0.17% 0.73% 0.70% 0.20% -0.41%
Minerals -1.31% 0.44% 0.74% -0.43% -0.25% 0.50% 0.46% -0.49%
Basic metals -1.76% -0.04% 0.67% -0.39% -0.79% -0.07% 0.73% -0.48%
Metal products -1.36% 0.00% 0.97% 0.79% 1.03% 0.38% -0.19% -0.17%
Computer -3.65% -0.44% 1.50% 1.70% 2.81% 4.43% -0.95% -0.66%
Electrical equipment -1.13% -2.32% 2.11% 1.24% 1.85% 1.69% -0.69% -0.39%
Machinery -1.92% 0.92% 0.76% 0.62% 0.55% 0.59% 0.35% -0.26%
Auto -1.63% 0.18% 0.78% 0.45% 0.48% 0.49% 0.13% -0.23%
Other transport -2.05% 0.55% 0.44% 0.55% 0.26% 0.57% 0.37% -0.23%
Other manufacturing -0.04% -0.28% 0.39% 0.72% 1.25% 0.28% -0.99% -0.04%
Other activities -1.10% 0.49% -0.30% -0.61% -0.12% 0.46% 0.29% -0.05%
Total -1.10% 0.54% -0.32% -0.66% -0.15% 0.46% 0.30% -0.14%
Table 6: Output changes in case one
One common feature across all economies is that the Computer sector responds
very strongly. Why? First, because this sector is hit by a higher than average
productivity shock in China and the production cost increases a lot. Table 2
shows the sectoral shock is -5% in case one, which is relatively big. In case two,
when the shock rises from 5% to 15%, output in the Computer sector drops by
1.2% (see Appendix Table A5). Second, the Computer sector is large. It accounts
for 27%, 21% and 29% of China, Japan and Korea’s total exports. When China’s
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exports become relatively expensive, firms switch to cheaper sources such as the
UK and the US. Therefore, the UK and the US have higher sectoral output.
Though all responses are strong, they differ in their signs. For example, the US’s
output increases by 4.43% while Japan’s output drops by 0.44%. This is partly
due to the different shares of intermediate goods as input. The Computer sector
uses around 30% intermediate goods as input in the US. While in Japan, it uses
53% intermediate goods. Since intermediate goods in other sectors become more
expensive, Japan’s computer production is further reduced.
In generally, sectors produce less in China if they are hit harder, but the magni-
tude of reductions varies. With a 5% productivity shock, the Auto sector’s output
declines by 1.63% while the Electrical equipment sector by 1.13%. This indicates
the importance of sector linkages. The Electrical equipment sector relies heavily
on other sectors, but the Auto sector is more independent. Another influential
factor is the reaction of the other economies. For example, the Petroleum sector is
also hit by a 5% shock in China, but it produces 2.6% more than before the shock.
This is because the EU, the UK, and Korea produce much fewer petroleum prod-
ucts. When the shock becomes -15% in the Petroleum sector in case two, China
produces even more, indicating its comparative advantage in producing coke and
refined petroleum products.
4.3 Changes in exports and model performance
A handful of sectors explain the main changes in exports as Table 7 shows.
For China and Japan, the Petroleum sectors gain the most. For Korea, the EU,
the UK, and the US, the Computer sectors exhibit the largest increases in their
export shares. While for the ROW, the changes are small and uniform across all
sectors.
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China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW
Sector Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Agriculture 1.76% 1.92% 0.62% 0.59% 0.45% 0.47% 5.13% 5.13% 1.08% 1.05% 5.33% 5.12% 2.37% 2.37%
Mining 1.13% 1.16% 0.15% 0.14% 0.95% 0.91% 8.41% 8.08% 19.56% 19.36% 25.80% 26.00% 30.01% 30.04%
Food 1.59% 1.57% 0.80% 0.79% 1.03% 1.04% 6.00% 6.07% 3.99% 4.01% 3.78% 3.78% 5.53% 5.52%
Textiles 14.53% 14.80% 1.29% 1.25% 2.24% 2.23% 5.43% 5.50% 2.83% 2.93% 1.07% 1.03% 3.54% 3.52%
Wood 0.88% 0.96% 0.07% 0.07% 0.03% 0.03% 1.12% 1.11% 0.15% 0.15% 0.36% 0.33% 0.83% 0.83%
Paper 0.96% 1.07% 1.11% 1.08% 0.89% 0.90% 2.15% 2.20% 1.34% 1.38% 0.95% 0.90% 0.74% 0.72%
Petroleum 3.37% 4.63% 8.24% 10.36% 10.65% 9.46% 9.60% 8.77% 7.41% 6.85% 8.23% 8.08% 0.60% 0.72%
Chemicals 4.60% 4.38% 7.61% 7.58% 11.04% 11.20% 10.58% 10.71% 9.85% 9.90% 11.33% 11.48% 10.66% 10.69%
Rubber and plastic 3.45% 3.36% 2.47% 2.44% 2.39% 2.43% 2.16% 2.19% 1.41% 1.43% 2.01% 2.03% 2.18% 2.18%
Minerals 2.80% 2.73% 1.17% 1.15% 0.62% 0.62% 1.22% 1.23% 0.56% 0.56% 0.78% 0.78% 0.81% 0.82%
Basic metals 3.32% 3.24% 6.80% 6.69% 8.42% 8.47% 4.20% 4.21% 11.95% 11.92% 3.69% 3.63% 6.97% 7.05%
Metal products 5.20% 5.14% 2.32% 2.26% 2.90% 2.98% 2.82% 2.89% 1.45% 1.51% 1.50% 1.48% 1.61% 1.60%
Computer 27.23% 26.24% 21.21% 20.65% 29.31% 29.72% 11.39% 11.65% 8.08% 8.40% 13.66% 14.47% 12.41% 12.31%
Electrical equipment 8.37% 8.41% 11.03% 10.38% 6.81% 7.00% 5.46% 5.57% 2.94% 3.02% 3.30% 3.34% 2.47% 2.45%
Machinery 8.56% 8.27% 13.52% 13.43% 8.39% 8.51% 9.25% 9.40% 5.81% 5.88% 8.12% 8.14% 5.15% 5.15%
Auto 2.14% 2.06% 17.10% 16.82% 10.44% 10.57% 7.55% 7.65% 8.93% 9.05% 5.62% 5.68% 8.29% 8.30%
Other transport 3.31% 3.20% 3.34% 3.21% 2.97% 3.00% 5.28% 5.34% 9.61% 9.51% 2.26% 1.52% 3.18% 3.11%
Other manufacturing 6.79% 6.85% 1.15% 1.11% 0.46% 0.46% 2.25% 2.29% 3.03% 3.11% 2.21% 2.22% 2.67% 2.64%
Table 7: Export shares by sector before and after the productivity shocks (case
one)
A natural question that arises is whether the model performs well in generating
trade flows after the shocks. If so, the new bilateral flows should be consistent with
the observed data in March 2020. Thus I compare the simulated data and the real
observations. The observed trade flows are again obtained from the International
Trade Centre and are converted from the HS6 into ISIC Rev4.19 The exports of
the ROW is again the sum of the other six economies’ imports.
China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW
Case one 0.950 0.870 0.972 0.710 0.602 0.645 0.832
Case two 0.938 0.868 0.976 0.722 0.613 0.660 0.846
Table 8: Correlations between the simulated and observed exports (Mar 2020)
Table 8 shows the correlations between the simulated data and real data in
March, 2020. The model performs well in general, especially for China, Korea,
and the ROW. The observed and predicted bilateral exports are plotted in figure
3. It is clear that some countries have lower correlations because the simulated
exports are much higher in the Mining sector. One possible explanation is that the
19As monthly data for China stopped updating in that database in year 2020, I have to
download the data from the General Administration of Customs of China. However, only HS2
level data is available instead of the HS6 level, meaning the direct conversion is infeasible.
Therefore, I calculate the proportion of each HS2 level product in the converted ISIC sector by
using the HS6 level data in Dec 2019 from ITC and then assume the proportions did not change
from Dec 2019 to Mar 2020. Finally, I compare the converted data with the directly obtained
HS2 data in Dec 2019 from the General Administration of Customs and make adjustments to
ensure the consistency.
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Mining sector is highly restricted by natural resource availability and could not
has dramatic changes in reality. The same logic applies to the Petroleum sector in
Japan. Nevertheless, the model has a satisfactory predict power using only sparse
parameters.
Figure 3: Comparisons between simulated data and observed exports (Mar 2020). Note: This figure presents
the observed and simulated sectoral exports in March 2020 for each economy. The x-axis shows sector numbers,
which are the same as in Table A1. Only 18 sectors are considered due to the high volume of trade in services
(the 19th sector).
5 Further extensions
This section quantifies the welfare effects and compares with the benchmark
results in section 4 performing different counterfactual exercises. I first estimate
the welfare effects across different models and confirm the importance of the in-
termediate goods and sectoral linkages. Then I assume the same shocks happen
in other economies to compare the differences in welfare effects. Finally, I in-
troduce the trade in services and show it does not influence the baseline results
significantly.
5.1 Model Comparison
This section compares the welfare effects of the same shocks using different
models. Table 9 compares the benchmark results in section 4 with a model without
the Input-Output structure and a model without intermediate materials as input.
The welfare effects become negligible when labor is the only input for production.
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Without the sectoral linkages, the welfare effects drop to about one-third to a
half of the benchmark levels, but the signs remain the same. The results are
consistent with Eppinger et al. (2020)’s finding that the welfare loss due to the
Covid-19 shock in China is reduced by 40% in the median country without sectoral
linkages. The decomposition shows that the reductions in other economies mainly
come from the terms of trade effects instead of the productivity effects.
Welfare effect Terms of trade effect Productivity effect
Baseline No Materials No IO Baseline No Materials No IO Baseline No Materials No IO
China -2.15% -0.80% -1.33% 0.03% -0.05% -0.05% -2.18% -0.74% -1.27%
Japan 0.13% 0.00% 0.06% 0.14% 0.00% 0.07% -0.02% 0.00% -0.02%
Korea 0.13% 0.00% 0.06% 0.19% 0.02% 0.08% -0.06% -0.01% -0.02%
EU27 0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% 0.00% -0.02%
UK -0.11% 0.00% -0.04% -0.08% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% 0.00% -0.02%
US -0.11% 0.00% -0.04% -0.09% 0.00% -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% -0.02%
ROW -0.04% -0.01% -0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% -0.05% -0.02% -0.05%
Table 9: Comparison across models
5.2 Comparison across economies
Another way to show China’s importance in global value chains is to compare
the welfare effects assuming the same sectoral shocks occur in other economies.
For example, if the same supply shock happens in Japan, what will the welfare
losses be in other economies? Will the impact be more severe or less? How about
Korea? To answer these questions, I conduct three exercises:
1. I assume the same sectoral shocks happen in the other six economies sepa-
rately and test the welfare effects.
2. I assume there is a uniform 20% supply shock in all sectors for each of the
seven economies and test the welfare effects.
3. I raise the shock level to 50% and make the comparison again.
In the first two exercises, the influences from other economies’ shocks are very
limited compared with the benchmark results. Most of the economies only suffer
from a 0.1% welfare loss when the shocks happen in another economy other than
China. Figure 3 shows the results in exercise 3: a uniform 50% sectoral productiv-
ity shock in each economy respectively. Shocks in China have the most significant
welfare effects on other economies, following by the EU. Interestingly, the US’s
shock does not affect other economies much, which is in line with the fact that
the US runs huge trade deficits.
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Figure 4: Comparison of a 50% uniform labor supply shock. Note: This figure presents the welfare changes in
all economies when there is a 50% labor supply shock in all sectors in one specific economy. The legend shows
where the shock originates from and the x-axis shows the economy affected.
5.3 Adding trade in services
Finally, I remove the restriction that services are non-tradable. The trade in
services data is collected from the World Bank and OECD International Trade
in Service Statistics (ITSS) database. As only annual trade flows are available, I
divide each series by twelve to get monthly flows.20 Then I divide the bilateral ex-
ports by an economy’s total exports to get proportions of trade with each partner.
The proportions are assumed to be constant until December 2019 to construct the
trade flows in that month. I incorporate the trade in services and estimate the new
equilibrium again. Table 10 compares the baseline results with the new results.
The welfare reductions are mitigated in the US and the UK but aggravated in the
EU and the ROW. The results for China are similar, while the TOT increase by
0.04% compared with the benchmark.
20The latest available data is in year 2019 for the US and the UK, in 2018 for Japan, Korea,
and EU, and in 2016 for China.
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Welfare effect Terms of trade effect Productivity effect
Baseline With service Baseline With service Baseline With service
China -2.15% -2.14% 0.03% 0.07% -2.18% -2.20%
Japan 0.13% 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% -0.02% -0.02%
Korea 0.13% 0.22% 0.19% 0.30% -0.06% -0.07%
EU27 0.02% -0.01% 0.05% 0.01% -0.03% -0.03%
UK -0.11% -0.03% -0.08% 0.00% -0.02% -0.03%
US -0.11% -0.09% -0.09% -0.07% -0.02% -0.02%
ROW -0.04% -0.08% 0.01% -0.02% -0.05% -0.06%
Table 10: Adding trade in services
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the trade and welfare effects of Hubei’s lockdown in China
on several economies by a Ricardian model with sectoral linkages and trade in
intermediate goods. I calibrate the model parameters using the data from STAN
and WIOD. I study two ranges of productivity shocks, assuming a minor loss
and a full loss in Hubei, according to the approach developed by Luo and Tsang
(2020). China’s welfare decreases by 2.15% in the first case and 4.20% in the
second case. The UK, the US, and the ROW all have lower welfare levels in
both cases. However, Japan and Korea’s real incomes increase. The Auto sector
in Japan and the Computer sector in Korea are the largest contributors. Those
sectors gain from substituting China’s exports.
I derive a theoretical representation for welfare decomposition, and I introduce
a new way to measure the influence of a productivity change on welfare. After
decomposing the welfare effects into terms of trade effect and productivity effect,
the former accounts for much more of the changes in all economies except for
China. Sectors vary a lot in their responses, depending on the sectoral linkages
and the industrial sizes. Generally, export-oriented sectors in China contribute
more to welfare changes given similar shock levels.
World output falls by 0.14% and 0.24% in two cases separately. The numbers
are still striking given the short period under consideration. China loses 1.10%
output in case one. The EU, Korea, and the UK’s output falls while Japan, the
US, and the ROW produce more in case one. World sectoral output also responds
differently. While the Computer sector’s production drops by 0.66%, the Other
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transport sector’s output falls by 0.04%. Similar results are found in case two,
although the magnitude is larger. After comparing the simulated data and the
observed data in March 2020, I find the model performs remarkably well using
relatively sparse parameters.
Finally, I conduct various exercises and compare the results with the bench-
mark. Comparison across models implies the importance of sectoral linkages and
intermediate goods, while comparison across countries reassures that China is
playing a significant role in global value chains. Adding trade in services confirms
the robustness of the baseline findings.
It is necessary to emphasize that this exercise only considers the lockdown of
Hubei province without thinking about the further transmission of the virus. Thus
the results only reflect a very small part of the influence of COVID shock on the
world economy. Nevertheless, Hubei’s lockdown provides a natural experiment to
study the importance of China’s role in global supply chains. Although the shock
only happens in China, it affects countries worldwide rapidly and strongly. As the
global trade pattern may change after the pandemic, how to optimize the supply




Number Sector abbreviation ISIC Rev 4 sectors
1 Agriculture D01T03: Agriculture, forestry and fishing
2 Mining D05T09: Mining and quarrying
3 Food D10T12: Food products, beverages and tobacco
4 Textiles D13T15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products
5 Wood D16: Wood and products of wood and cork
6 Paper D17T18: Paper products and printing
7 Petroleum D19: Coke and refined petroleum products
8 Chemicals D20T21: Chemicals and pharmaceutical products
9 Rubber and plastic D22: Rubber and plastic products
10 Minerals D23: Other non-metallic mineral products
11 Basic metals D24: Basic metals
12 Metal products D25: Fabricated metal products
13 Computer D26: Computer, electronic and optical products
14 Electrical equipment D27: Electrical equipment
15 Machinery D28: Machinery and equipment, nec
16 Auto D29: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
17 Other transport D30: Other transport equipment
18 Other manufacturing D31T33: Other manufacturing; repair and installation
19 Other activities D36T99: Other activities
Table A.1: Sector List
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Number Name Country list
1 China CHN: China
2 Japan JPN: Japan





























5 UK GBR: United Kingdom
6 US USA: United States of America
7 ROW ROW: Rest of the world
Table A.2: Country list
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Sectors
China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW
TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod TOT Prod
Agriculture -2.22% 4.60% 0.13% 0.26% -0.13% 0.27% 8.12% 0.24% -1.57% 0.11% 2.54% 0.13% -4.33% 0.91%
Mining -25.13% 1.03% -24.31% 1.32% -26.48% 0.41% -13.34% 0.03% 6.40% 0.00% 10.79% 0.00% 24.86% 0.08%
Food -4.19% 9.01% -1.56% 4.53% -1.11% 2.76% 2.12% 1.28% -3.95% 0.98% -1.79% 1.36% 3.03% 1.63%
Textiles 9.07% 1.20% -0.85% 5.06% -1.42% 4.72% 4.06% 3.68% -5.96% 2.98% -5.19% 3.97% -2.75% 3.40%
Wood -0.19% 0.31% -0.27% 0.13% -0.36% 0.10% 1.29% 0.19% -1.37% 0.18% -0.62% 0.16% 0.04% 0.07%
Paper 0.00% 0.18% 0.67% 0.08% 0.51% 0.06% 3.65% 0.06% 0.12% 0.07% -0.65% 0.15% -1.85% 0.07%
Petroleum 1.96% 0.45% 4.03% 0.05% 9.16% 0.43% 24.96% 0.11% 7.24% 0.12% 3.22% 0.05% -19.06% 0.41%
Chemicals -7.13% -27.10% 2.89% -25.02% 5.22% -36.35% -2.53% -15.62% -10.75% -13.58% -5.61% -9.81% 7.28% -11.39%
Rubber and plastic 2.44% 9.78% 1.22% 18.58% 1.54% 7.50% -2.43% 13.02% -3.41% 19.46% -1.15% 13.38% 0.39% 9.78%
Minerals 1.76% 5.65% 0.50% 2.64% -0.25% 5.16% 0.74% 2.50% -0.89% 2.69% -0.57% 2.25% -0.99% 3.08%
Basic metals -8.86% 4.22% 2.71% 2.02% 5.11% 3.52% -1.13% 0.96% 8.74% 0.27% -0.91% 0.22% 2.96% 1.68%
Metal products 4.71% 0.63% 0.34% 2.38% 1.63% 1.03% 1.78% 0.98% -1.78% 0.93% -3.01% 1.49% -1.82% 0.82%
Computer 13.35% 4.45% 9.10% 28.43% 16.49% 28.55% -3.84% 21.24% -12.44% 12.93% -15.31% 19.11% -0.56% 15.18%
Electrical equipment 6.36% 1.83% 8.33% 4.61% 5.72% 2.63% 5.03% 4.61% -5.75% 3.83% -3.62% 3.43% -6.82% 3.30%
Machinery 4.94% 7.69% 9.61% 8.61% 5.42% 8.26% 4.94% 14.16% -6.22% 11.06% -3.82% 11.57% -6.29% 9.62%
Auto -0.52% 20.62% 30.44% 10.32% 18.62% 5.94% -16.44% 9.12% -18.62% 8.05% -27.67% 9.90% 12.82% 4.46%
Other transport 5.72% 29.35% 2.59% 31.09% 0.77% 61.50% -0.52% 35.46% 3.75% 42.52% -10.12% 33.48% 1.50% 53.48%
Other manufacturing 1.45% 0.46% 0.47% 4.91% -0.05% 3.51% -3.07% 8.00% -1.03% 7.39% -3.39% 9.14% 2.65% 3.40%
Other activities 0.00% 25.65% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table A.3: Sectoral contributions to the aggregate effects (case two)
China Japan Korea EU UK US ROW
Agriculture -0.47% 2.38% 1.43% 2.22% 2.63% 2.68% 1.96%
Mining 0.54% 2.54% 1.88% 2.14% 1.65% 1.84% 1.60%
Food 0.69% 2.65% 2.74% 2.81% 2.82% 3.32% 2.91%
Textiles 1.19% 2.73% 2.66% 2.34% 1.96% 3.12% 2.55%
Wood 0.74% 2.66% 2.23% 2.60% 2.60% 3.17% 2.44%
Paper 1.21% 2.64% 2.53% 2.56% 2.50% 3.00% 2.78%
Petroleum 1.31% 1.92% 2.60% 2.59% 2.72% 2.41% 2.19%
Chemicals 1.65% 3.33% 2.83% 3.22% 2.53% 2.52% 2.96%
Rubber and plastic 1.68% 3.23% 2.47% 2.73% 2.34% 2.88% 3.00%
Minerals 1.39% 2.61% 2.67% 2.60% 3.01% 2.74% 2.48%
Basic metals 1.69% 2.91% 2.55% 2.86% 3.29% 3.32% 2.55%
Metal products 1.74% 2.86% 2.26% 2.36% 2.01% 2.77% 2.67%
Computer 2.70% 3.00% 2.81% 2.56% 2.27% 1.83% 3.01%
Electrical equipment 2.18% 3.30% 2.75% 2.68% 2.64% 2.64% 2.98%
Machinery 2.38% 2.93% 2.92% 2.87% 2.78% 3.20% 3.29%
Auto 6.06% 7.04% 5.11% 5.36% 4.61% 5.43% 5.75%
Other transport 3.81% 4.49% 3.56% 2.84% 4.01% 4.20% 4.77%
Other manufacturing 0.55% 3.11% 2.71% 2.34% 2.09% 2.81% 3.02%
Other activities 0.82% 2.30% 1.84% 1.98% 2.28% 2.37% 2.16%
Table A.4: Changes in sectoral costs (case two)
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China Japan Korea EU27 UK US ROW Sectoral Total
Agriculture -1.53% 0.45% 0.13% -0.96% -1.40% -1.20% 0.51% -0.55%
Mining 1.16% -8.56% -6.72% -6.96% -2.54% -0.47% 0.57% -0.26%
Food -2.31% 0.88% 0.04% -0.07% 0.09% 0.42% 0.38% -0.38%
Textiles -0.29% -0.86% -1.39% 0.97% 3.16% -2.95% -0.49% -0.25%
Wood -0.40% -0.16% -0.09% -0.94% -0.57% -2.45% 0.41% -0.46%
Paper -0.31% 0.26% 0.11% 0.53% 0.70% -1.04% -2.31% -0.41%
Petroleum 5.30% 10.78% -13.94% -8.09% -8.31% -0.21% 12.75% -0.54%
Chemicals -3.94% 1.55% 1.24% 0.75% 0.29% 0.73% 0.76% -0.65%
Rubber and plastic -3.70% 0.55% 1.67% 0.81% 1.49% 1.33% 0.66% -0.71%
Minerals -2.67% 0.87% 1.16% -0.22% 0.18% 1.02% 0.83% -0.96%
Basic metals -3.59% 0.13% 1.22% 0.08% -0.47% 0.41% 1.21% -0.93%
Metal products -2.66% 0.25% 1.18% 1.28% 1.84% 0.88% 0.10% -0.27%
Computer -7.01% -0.02% 1.26% 3.19% 4.71% 7.23% -0.71% -1.20%
Electrical equipment -2.39% -2.94% 1.31% 2.51% 2.42% 2.87% -1.04% -0.75%
Machinery -3.83% 1.89% 1.25% 1.30% 1.39% 1.20% 0.74% -0.48%
Auto -3.45% -0.50% 1.23% 1.09% 2.07% 1.26% 0.36% -0.46%
Other transport -4.14% 0.96% 0.76% 1.46% 0.78% 1.03% 0.66% -0.42%
Other manufacturing -1.13% -0.03% 0.45% 1.43% 1.79% 0.75% -0.88% 0.01%
Other activities -2.25% 0.76% -0.54% -0.47% 0.06% 0.74% 0.43% -0.05%
sum -2.27% 0.80% -0.61% -0.54% 0.01% 0.74% 0.45% -0.24%
Table A.5: Output changes after the shock (case two)
B Formular
B.1 Derivation of prices of the intermediate goods
To get a simple expression for the distribution of prices, I follow Eaton and
Kortum (2002) to assume the country n′s efficiency distribution is Frechet:
F jn(z) = e
−T jnz−θ
j
and is independent across countries, sectors and goods. The parameter T jn controls
the likelihood of the higher efficiency draw of zjn. θ
j is treated as common to all
countries and decides the variation within the distribution. Thus a higher T jn
means an absolute advantage in country n, sector j and a lower θj implies more
heterogeneity across goods in countries’ relative efficiencies.
Plugging the above expression into pjni, we get its distribution












Thus the distribution of the lowest price of an intermediate good ωj in country n
has the following distribution
G(P jn) = 1−
N∏
i=1















The exact formula of price of the composite goods P jn is












and Γ is the Gamma function. I also assume that σj < 1 + θj to ensure a well
defined price index. Some sectors are non-tradable by assuming the local suppliers




n is also the price for final goods that consumers buy. The








B.2 Derivation of the equation (2.14)
The exact formular of P jn is











































































































B.3 Derivation of the welfare decomposition
I start with the first part in equation (2.18). The change in wages (lnwn) can









d lnP kn (B.4)




















































Now I turn to the second part of equation (2.18). From the definition of the


















d lnT ji ) (B.5)
To simplify the notifications, I substitute out αjn by combing the labor market































































d lnT ji , (B.8)
where Ejni is the sector j’s exports from country n to country i and M
j
ni is the
imports of country n from country i.
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earthquake”. Review of Economics and Statistics 101.1, pp. 60–75.
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